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In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
HUBERT \YOLFE, SHIRLEY WOLFE, 
his \Yife, ELLIOTT WOLFE, KAYLA 
\YOLFE and :JfERRILL STRONG, co-
partners, doing business under the firm 
name and style of WOLFE'S DEPART-
:JlEXT STORE and WOLFE'S DE-
p ART:i\IEXT STORE, a co-partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SARAH \YHITE and JAMES L. WHITE, 
her husband, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7153 
This is an action for breach of covenant contained 
in a lease agreement. A general demurrer to the com-
plaint as amended was sustained, and from the judgment 
dismissing the action, plaintiffs have appealed. 
It is alleged in the complaint that on February 19, 
1945, appellants and r~espondents entered into said agree· 
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2 
ment by the terms whereof, respondents leased to ap· 
pellants that certain building at 248-56 South State 
Street in Salt Lake City for the term commencing March 
7, 1945, and ending :May 31, 1956 with the privilege of 
renewal for an additional ten years. The lease is made 
a part of the complaint and contains among others the 
following provisions : 
"(3) The rental for the last ten-year term of 
this lease is fixed at Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) 
per month, upon the express condition that the Les· 
sees will, and they hereby agree to, at their own ex· 
pense, make permanent improvements to the build· 
ing herein leased, including the installation of a 
first-class front therein, which improvements shall 
cost not less but may cost more than, Ten Thousand 
Dollars ( $10,000.00). Said Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) shall not include the cost of trade fix-
tures, or any other removable fixtures, but shall 
include only the cost of permanent improvements to 
the building. If it should develop that necessary 
permanent improvements can be made for less than 
Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00), then the rent 
for the last ten-year term of this lease shall be in· 
creased Ten Dollars ($10.00) per month, or frac-
tion thereof, for every thousand dollars, or fraction 
thereof, that the permanent improvements cost less 
than Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00), and for 
the purpose of determining the fact, Lessees agree 
at the completion of said permanent improvements 
to furnish Lessors with an itemized statement of the 
cost of permanent improvements made as aforesaid. 
The said permanent improvements are to be com· 
menced on or before June 7th, 1946, or as soon there-
after as Government restrictions will permit. Rental 
shall be paid during the time said improvements 
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are being- made. All such pennanent improvements 
and construction shall be completed free and clear 
of all liens and claims of contractors, sub-contrac-
tors, mechanics, laborers, materialmen and other 
persons having· sin1ilar claims. All such permanent 
improvements shall upon installation become part 
of the realty and shall be surrendered to the Lessors 
in good order and condition as when constructed, 
reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire- or 
other casualty excepted. After said permanent im-
provements are made, it is agreed that further 
structural changes shall not be made to said prem-
ises by the Lessees, without first obtaining the writ-
ten consent of the Lessors, which consent Lessors 
covenant will not unreasonably be withheld. 
'' ( 6) In consideration of the rental he-rein 
fixed, the Lessees agree to and do hereby accept said 
premises in the condition and state of repair they 
are now in, and for the last ten years of this lease, 
all improvements, upkeep and repairs, of e.very kind 
and nature whatsoever, regardless of the extent 
thereof and whether the same be ordinary or ex-
traordinary, and regardless of how the same may be 
necessitated, except as hereinafter stated, including 
repair and upkeep of the heating plant and replace-
ment of all glass, including plate glass broken, are 
to be made at the expense of the Lessees. If plate 
glass insurance is carried, it shall be carried at the 
expense of the Lessees. (Italics ours.) 
'' (8) For the entire term of this lease the Les-
sors shall have the obligation to keep the roof of the 
leased premises in good condition and repair; to 
pay general taxes and lighting assessments levied 
aO'ainst said property, all fire insurance premiums a~d premiums on any other insurance the owner 
elects to carry. (Italics ours.) 
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"(11) Lessors shall not be liable for any dam-
age occasioned by failure to keBp said premises in 
repair and shall not be liable for any damage done, 
caused or occasioned by or from plumbing, gas, 
water, steam or other pipes, or the bursting, leaking 
or running of any washstand, tank, water closet or 
waste pipe, in, upon or about said building or prem-
ises, nor from any damage occasioned by water aris-
ing from acts or neglect of neighboring tenants.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
In the complaint, it is alleged in substance, that pre· 
para tory to making the permanent improvements re· 
quired by paragraph three, Lessees employed a qualified 
architect, who made application to the Building Inspector 
for a permit to make said improvements, and that the 
Building Inspector notified said architect under date of 
March 21, 1946, that it bad been called to the Inspector's 
attention: 
"That the rafters which form the roof framing 
have been overstressed and are sagging under the 
load they -carry, also the girders between the columns 
at the rear of the store are undersized and bowed." 
(Italics ours.) 
and that the application for permit would be held in 
abeyance until assurance was given that ''the roof con-
dition will be take'fl; care of," and the Inspector states in 
said letter: "A plan showing your proposal will be ex· 
pected." (Italics ours.) 
It is then alleged that the Building Inspector sent 1 • 
another letter to Lessees under date of April 29, 1946, 
stating that the trusses of the roof truss system "were 
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not adequate both as to des·ign and as to constructiofb." 
Also that ''the main ceiling beams both for the front and 
rear part of the store are sagged and a,re evidern.tly too 
light to carry the roof load," and that "the To of drain-
age system has proved to be inadequate." (Italics ours.) 
The provisions of the Building Code, particularly 
Sec. 201 and Sees. 301 to and including 305 are made a 
part of the complaint and that in Sec. 301, it is provided 
that any building or portion thereof found to be dan-
gerous or unsafe or which violates the provisions of 
said Code may be corndemned by the Building Inspector 
and that the Building Inspector shall serve notice on the 
owner in writing or to the person in charge of any build-
ing or premises setting forth what must be done to make 
swid building safe, and that the person receiving such 
notice shall commence with,in forty-eight hours to make 
the necessary changes, repairs or alterations and pro-
ceed diligently with such work and that no building shall 
be occupied after the service of said notice until the 
instructions of the Building Inspector have bee~ com-
plied with. 
It is alleged that Lessors were notified by the Build-
ing Inspector "of the u~safe condition of said roof" on 
January 22, 1946, and by Lessees on several occasions 
prior to June 7th, and of the requirements and letters 
of the Building Inspector, but that Lessors failed to 
meet said requirements and to put said roof in safe con-
dition, and that 
''in order to occupy the leased premises at all 
a~J~~,d to make them tenantable, plaintiffs were com-
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pelled to comply with said requirements aforesaid 
and did place said roof in good condition and repair 
and repaired the same to make it safe and in good 
condition and also so as to provide proper drain-
age" (Italics ours.) (Br., p. 22, par. 7.) 
By what appellants have designated a "Bill of Par-
ticulars,'' they allege that in the opinion of certain archi-
tects, engineers and contractors employed by them ''the 
best, quickest and most econmnical method of making 
said roof safe was to tear down the entire roof'' and that 
as steel was '' easier to obtain" than wood, steel con-
struction was used. (Br., p. 33.) Further, "that since 
steel was used, it was unnecessary to continue the use of 
eight center supporting posts in the middle of the store-
room and they were eliminated." (Br., p. 34.) By 
"Exhibit D" attached to the complaint, (Br., pp. 31-33) 
the items of cost aggregating the damage claimed by 
appellants are set forth, from which exhibit it appears 
that a new roof of steel beam construction was substi-
tuted for the old wood roof at a net cost of $12,175.39. 
Other.items bring the total damage prayed for to $21,-
121.58. The complaint contains son1e additional allega-
tions which in no sense constitute a part of plaintiffs' 
cause of action (to which we shall hereafter make refer-
ence), but the foregoing are in substance all allegations, 
including all provisions of the lease which are pertinent 
to the present inquiry. 
Under the agreement: 
(a) Lessees ''accept said premises 1n the condi-
tion and state of repair they are now in." (Par. 6.) 
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(b) ''For the last ten years of this lease, all im-
proYements, upkeep a11lid repairs of every kind and nature 
whatsoever regardless of the extent thereof and whether 
the same be ordinary or extraordinary and regardless 
of how the same may be necessitated except as herein-
after stated . . . are to be made at the expense of 
the Lessees." (Par. 6.) (Italics ours.) 
(c) Lessors agree that "for the entire term of 
this lease, Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the 
roof of the leased premises in good condition and re·· 
pair." (Par. 8.) 
(d) "Lessors shall not be liable for any damage 
occasioned by failure to keep said premises in repair, 
and shall not be liable for any damage done, caused or 
occasioned by or from plumbing, gas, water, etc." (Par. 
11.) 
ARGUMENT 
We must test the sufficiency of the complaint by a 
d~termination of Lessors' obligation under the lease and 
by ascertaining whether, under the facts alleged, a breach 
is shown. 
First, what was Lessors' obligation~ 
''Lessors agree that 'for the entire term of this 
lease, lessors shall have the obligation to keep the 
roof of the leased premises in good condition1 and 
repair.' " (Par. 8.) 
This is the sole and only covenant of Lessors upon 
which Lessees can rely and must be construed together 
with the following provisions: 
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''At their own expense, (to) make permanent 
improvements to the building herein leased, includ-
ing the installation of a first-class front therein, 
which improvements shall cost not less, but may cost 
more, than ten thousand dollars. . . . After said 
permanent improvem·ents are made, it is agreed 
that further structural changes shall not be made 
to said premises by the Lessees, without first ob-
taining the written consent of the Lessors, which con-
sent Lessors covenant will not unreasonably be with-
held." (Par. 3.) 
"In consideration of the rental herein fixed the 
Lessees agree to arnd do hereby accept the premises 
in the condition and sta.te of repair they are now in 
and for the last ten years of this lease, all improve-
ments, upkeep and repairs of every kind and nature 
whatsoever and whether the same be ordinary or 
extraordinary and regardless of how the same mG!!J 
be necessitated except as hereinafter stated . . . 
are to be made at the expense of the Lessees.'' 
(Par. 6.) 
The nature and character of the ''permanent im-
provements'' n1entioned in paragraph 3 are nowhere 
specified, but were left to the judgment and discretion 
of the Lessees. The words, ''except as hereinafter 
stated" in paragraph 6 refer, of course, to the above-
quoted provision of paragraph 8 relating to the roof. 
Now having all these provisions in mind, let us ascer-
tain: (a) What was the legal obligation of the Lessors; 
and (b) Does the work performed by the Lessees fall 
within the Lessors' obligation~ 
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COVEN~\.NT ·•TO 1'-EB~P," DO:b~S NOT OBLIGATE 
··TO PL.A.CE,'' IN REPAIR 
The written covenant of the landlord to make re-
pairs may not be extended beyond its fair intent or en-
larged by construction ( 36 C. J. 135), and the word '' re-
pair'' has reference to the condition of the premises at 
the time of the letting and requires the Lessors only to 
keep the premises in the condition in which they were at 
the time of the lease (36 C. J. 142), that is to say, in the 
condition in ·which the Lessees accepted them. The cove-
nant "to keep in repair" and •' to keep in as good repair 
as tlzey are now in" mean the same. (32 Am. Jur. 585.) 
In St. Joseph etc. Co. v. St. Louis etc. Co., (Mo.) 
36 S. W. 602, the lease provided: 
''The party of the second part, moreover 
"'ill keep said demised railroad equipment and prop-
erty in good order and repa·ir, etc." (Italics ours.) 
Of course this means the same as g·ood condition and 
repair. It cannot have any other meaning. Says the 
court: 
''A covenant to keep leased premises in repair 
imposes upon the tenant the obligation 'to keep' 
the premises in as good repair as when the agree-
ment is made. Middlekauf v. Snlith, 1 :Md. 329 (and 
other cases). Covenants 'to keep in repair' and 
'to keep in as good repair as they now are' are held 
to amount to the same thing." 
"To keep the roof in good condition and repair" 
did not imply an obligation to do anything to make the 
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building tenantable or fit for use, but only to do such 
repair work as might become necessary after the date 
of the lease to keep the roof in as good condition as 
when it had been accepted, that is, as of February 19, 
1945. 
In F arr v. Wasatch Chemical 0 ompany, ____________ Utah 
____________ , 143 Pac. ( 2d) 281, the lease provided : 
''Lessor shall keep the floor and roof in good 
repair, except as to damages caused by Lessee-, at 
her expense so as to keep said premises tenantable; 
all other repairs and alterations after oc-eupancy 
shall be done at the Lessee's expense." (Italics 
ours.) 
The Lessor sued for the rent and for $17 4.00 expended 
in repairing the floor broken by Lessee's hea.vy machin-
ery. The Lessee by way of defense alleged in its answer 
an oral agreement: 
''The plaintiff, being apprised and knowing the 
nature and kind of business in which the defendant 
was engaged, covenanted and agreed with said de-
fendant to place that certain warehouse existing 
upon the above said premises in good and service-
able condition for the immediate occupancy and ben-
efit and use of the said defendant, and further the 
said plaintiff specifically agreed to repair and main-
ta.in the roof, elevator and floors of the above ware-
house in good, safe and serviceable condition." 
(Italics ours.) 
The court held that said a.llegations set forth a col-
lateral obligation of the L·essor to place in repair which 
covenant was additional to, outside of, and beyond the 
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covenant of the landlord as contained in the lease, and 
that evidence was proper to sustain such additional 
agreement. In other words, the court held, in effect 
that the written coYenant "to keep" did not include the 
covenant '"to place'' in good repair. 
Let us quote briefly from the case of Nixon v. Gam-
mon, (Ky.) 2:29 S. \Y. 75. In that case, the lease con-
tained the proYision that the landlord should make all 
''extraordinary repairs'' and that 
' ' The said Lessee further agrees that he· will 
keep said premises in good condition and repair and 
at the termination of the lease to surrender them to 
the Lessor in as good condition as they are now, or-
dinary wear and tear from reasonable use thereof 
excepted.'' 
It differs from the case at bar in that the obligation 
"to keep in good condition and repair" was on the Lessee 
instead of the Lessor, and it applied to the entire prem-
ises, rather than to just the roof. The last clause of 
the covenant, ''to surrender the same to the Lessor etc.'' 
is not important because it did not affect the Lessee's ob-
ligation to "keep said premises in good condition and 
repair.'' The court remarks : 
''By this clause, Lessee agreed to keep up all 
ordinary repairs to that part of the building which 
he occupied, and Lessor was only required to keep up 
extraordinary repairs. 'Ordinary repairs' are such 
as result from ordinary wear and tear of the build-
ing and its decay, but 'extraordinary repairs' is 
something greater than this. It is such repairs as 
are made necessary by some unusual or unforeseen 
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occurrence which does not destroy the building, but 
merely renders it less suited to the use for which it 
was intended. The word 'repair' does not include 
the word 'rebuild' and the courts have never so 
held.'' 
Could anything be plainer than this statement of the 
law or more applicable to the case at bar~ Our case, 
however, is even stronger because here Lessees accepted 
the premises in the condition they were in February 19, 
1945, and agreed to make all ''improvements'' and all 
extraordina.ry repairs -of whatsoever kind or character 
and regardless of the nature and extent thereof and 
however necessitated, while Lessors, under the construc-
tion placed upon the language of the lease by the Ken-
tucky court, agreed to make only ordinary repairs to 
the roof, which the Lessees bad accepted. Can it with 
reason be contended that the obligation to keep an ac-
cepted roof in good condition and repair obligated the 
Lessor to destroy the roof and the understructure support 
thereof and substitute one of steel beam construction~ 
Would not such substitution be an "improvement" or an 
"extraord.inary repair" within the obligation of the 
Lessees~ Will the court impose an unjustified obligation 
on the Lessors in order that the Lessees may escape the 
consequences of their acceptance of the roof (as part of 
the premises), as it was, and of their specific covenant 
to make a.t their own expense all improvements and all 
extraordina.ry repairs, however necessitated~ There is 
no aU ega tion in the complaint that the roof as accepted 
ever beca·me out of repair. There is no possible basis 
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for any such claim. The letters of the Building Inspec-
tor upon which appellants rely show nothing of the kind. 
Those letters shtnY that the criticism offered was that 
the roof trusses '·were JIO·t adeqwa.te, both as to design 
and as to erection." His criticisms do not intimate that 
there "·as any change in the roof from the time it was 
accepted until the time of inspection. 
In Kin.gsted ~·. fVTight etc. Co., (Minn.) 133 N. W. 
399, the obligation of the landlord was ''to keep the 
premises in good repair'' and it was held that the land-
lord was not required to improve the property by the 
construction of a drain to carry water, which in wet 
weather flowed into the basement. The court remarks: 
"This did not impose upon him an obligation to 
rnake improvements or betterments. . . . The 
defendant took the premises in their condition when 
the contract was made, the building was not then out 
of repair and the covenant for repairs can be re-
ferred only to such defects in the building as subse-
quently arose, injury or damage arising from the 
elements or natural decay incident to the property 
and its use." (Italics ours.) 
While the court remarks that ''the building was not 
then out of repair'' the same is true as to the roof, in 
the case at bar so far as Lessees are concerned, for they 
are estopped from claiming otherwise by their accept-
ance of the premises.'' 
There is a studious avoidance by appellants of the 
phrase • • keep in good conditio,n and repair'' as used in 
the lease. They seek to substitute the term "place" in 
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a condition, and in a different condition from that ac-
cepted. 32 A'm. Jur. pp. 673-4 points out that these 
terms e~press entirely different obligations, also that 
different covenants in the same contract dealing with 
''condition as accepted,'' and ''condition as agreed to be 
kept", are clearly distinguishable. To quote: 
''A covenant to keep leased premises in' repair' 
imposes upon the tenant the obligation to keep them 
in as good r~pair as at the commencement of the 
term. . . . It wouJd seem clear that under a cove-
nant . . . to keep premises in such repair as the 
same are in at the commencement of the term, he is 
not liable for defects arising from the original con-
struction of the building.'' 
In Cadman v. By-Grade Foods Produc·ts Corpovra-
tion, (Mass.) 33 N. E. (2d) 759, the action was for failure 
to return the premises ''in good tenantable condition'' 
as stipulated. Actually they were not in that condition 
when returned because they required a new floor under-
structure. Plaintiff demanded a strict technical inter-
pretation of this covenant. Says the court: 
"All the plaintiff's exceptions are based upon 
their contention that the defendant was obligated 
to surrender the premises at the end of the term in 
good tenantable repair, regardless of their actual 
conditio~l at the time the term began.'' 
While in that case it was admitted in the lease that 
the premises were then in "good condition," it is the 
same here because of appellants' acceptance of the con-
dition as of February 19, 1945. The court then remarks: 
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'·There "·as evidence from which it could ha:ve 
been folmd that the conditions above described were 
substantially the same at the beginning as at the 
end of the term. 
"The phrases 'in good tenantable repair' and 'in 
good condition~ appearing in such lease do not have 
a fi.xed or technical meaning which is. always the 
same regardless of the character or use of the build-
ing to which they refer.'' 
Later on the court remarks in referring to the good 
condition at the commencement of the lease: 
''The standard there set is the actual state of 
repair, "~hether good or bad, in which the premises 
were at the time of the letting, not a degree of repair 
measured by the abstract standard of goodness. 
''It is proper in the construction of the language 
of a lease to read together different provisions 
therein dealing with the same subject matter, and 
where possible all the language used should be given 
a reasonable meaning. 
' '\Vhen, however, this covenant is read with the 
earlier admission in the lease that the premises 
were 'in good condition' at the time of its execu-
tion, uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase 
'in good tenantable repair' disappears and all the 
language of the lease respecting the condition of the 
premises as to repair may be given significance. 
Thus read, the intention of the parties is adequately 
manifested that the actual condition of the building 
in respect to good tenantable repair existing when 
the term began should be the condition as to good 
tenantable repair in which the building was required 
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to be when delivered up to the p~aintiffs at the end 
of the term, except as to the effect of reasonable 
wearing and use.'' 
Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, here is 
an agreement by the Lessees accepting the premises, 
(including the roof) in the condition they were in on 
February 19, 1945. Lessors' covenant is referable to 
that condition, and they were obligated only to keep the 
roof in such condition. Are they required to pay the cost 
of destroying the roof and its supporting understruc--
ture and constructing a new roof and understructure of 
different materials~ 
LESSORS OBLIGATED TO MAKE ONLY ORDI-
NARY REP AIR.S TO THE ROOF. 
Except for Lessors' covenant in paragraph 8, they 
would have no obligation whatever to make any repairs. 
There is no implied covenant of the Lessor either 
that the premises are fit for occupancy or that they are 
safe for use. (32 Am. Ju,r. 516 and cases there cited.) 
The authorities are to the effect that only by express 
warranty can the Lessor be held responsible for the con~ 
dition of the premises, either at the date of the lease or 
during the term. Otherwise he is not a guarantor of the 
fitness of a building for the use- for which it is leased. 
Robinson v. Wilson, (Wash.) 183 Pac. 331. In this. case, 
the court quotes from Tiffany on ''Landlord and Ten-
ant'' !P· 86: as follows : 
''It is agreed by the authorities at the present 
time that as a general rule there is no obligation on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
the part of the Lessor to see that the premises. are at 
the time of the demise in a condition of fitness. for 
use for the purposes for which the Lessee may pro-
pose to use them. A Lessee, like the purchaser of a 
thing already in existence, is presumed to take only 
after exan1ination. The maxim, caveat emptor, ap-
plies, and if he desires to protect himself in this re-
gard, he must exact of the Lessor an express stipu-
lation as to the condition of the premises. Accord-
ingly a landlord is not bound, as a general rule, in 
the absence of special stipulation, to make repairs 
or improvements on the premises in order to render 
them safe or fit them for the tenant's use.'' 
A covenant to repair or to keep in repair is referred 
to in the cases as a ''general covenant'' and is construed 
to obligate the Lessor to make only ordinary repairs as 
distinguished from a larger or "special covenant'' to 
make repairs that are wnusual or extraordinary. I-Ie·re 
the Lessor makes only a general covenant; but the Lessee 
makes the larger covenant. 
By their "Bill of Particulars" appellants clearly 
reveal what is tacitly admitted by Exhibit "D" attached 
to their complaint that Lessees did not undertake to 
repair the roof or to keep it in good condition (the obli-
gation of the Lessors), but they removed the entire roof 
and supporting structure constructed of wood, and sub-
stituted therefor one of steel beam construction. Unless 
Lessors' obligation "to keep the roof in good condition 
and repair" imposed a duty on them to build such a 
new structure [roof] J Appellants have very clearly ad-
mitted that they have no cause of action. The question 
of law is just that sirnple and there is. no necessity for the 
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court to attempt to find a way through the jungle of im-
materialities, inconsistencies and unwarranted assump-
tions contained in a!Ppellants' brief. 
The courts have interpreted the "general covenant" 
to be restricted as follows : 
In May v. Gillis, (N.Y.) 62 N. E. 385, the court says: 
''We think the words 'all inside and outside re-
pairs' import merely a general covenant. Under 
this clause the defendant was bound to make all 
ordinary repairs, but was not called upon to make 
those which were extraordinary.'' 
And in Freiot v. Jones, 204 N. Y. S. 446, the court 
said: 
"The obligation of a landlord to repair the 
demised premises rests solely upon express con-
tract. The covenant to repair will not be impJied 
nor an e:x!press covenant be enlarged by construc-
tion. The only covenant to repair expressed in the 
lease is 'also landlord to do outside repairs, tenant 
to keep inside in repair.' This does not refer to 
extraordinary repairs such as were necessary after 
the fire. It is a general covenant to make ordinar¥ 
repairs only and under it the landlord was not ob-
ligated to restore the building after the fire.'' 
See also Houston v. Springer, 2 Raile (Pa. 1828) 97. 
The covenant of the Lessors in the case at bar is one 
to make necessary repairs to the roof then on the build-
ing as it had been accepted, not to reconstruct the roof. 
In Lurcott v. Wakely, (1911) 1 K. B. 905, it is said: 
''A roof falls out of re!pair; the neeessary work 
is to replace decayed timbers by sound wood; to 
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substitute sound tiles or slato8 for thos,e which are 
cracked, broken or missing; to make good the flush-
ings and the like. . . . I agree that if repair of 
the whole subject matter has become impossible a 
coyenant to repair does not carry an obligation to 
renew or replace.'' 
See also l\ri~rou u. Gammon, (Ky.) 229' S. W. 75, here-
tofore cited. 
In 140 TVest Thirty-Fourth Stt·eet Corp. v. Davis, 
(1936) :285 N. Y. S. 957, it is held that a structural im-
provement, such as a new floor that a Building Depart-
ment required to be laid, was held not within a Lessee's 
covenant to make all repairs, inasmuch as only ordinary 
repairs, and not the possibility that a structural rm-
provement might be required, were contemplated. 
" 'Repair' means to restore to a, sound or good 
state after decay, injury, dil~pidation or partial de-
struction and is synonymous with 'mend' and 're-
novate,' but generally does not mean to alter or 
change condition or to replace with new or differ-
ent material. Mozingo v. W ellsberg, 131 S. E. 717; 
101 W.Va. 79." 
• 'As used in a lease in which the Lessee prom-
ises to keep the building in repair, the word '' re-
pair' vvill be held to mean to mend, not to make a 
new thing, but to refit, make good or restore an 
existing thing, and when we speak of repairing a 
thing the very ex;pression presupposes something in 
existence to he repaired. Wattles v. South Omaha 
Ice & Coal Co., 59 N. W. 785; citing numerous cases.'' 
See also Gulf City v. City of Galveston, 7 S. W. 520, 
521, 59 Tex. 660; Fuche v. City of Cedar Rapids, 139 N. 
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W. 803, 158 Iowa 392, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590; Dough-
erty v. Taylor & Norton .Co., 63 S. E. 9'29, 930, 5 Ga. App. 
773; Pl.aza Amusement Co. v. Rothenberg, (Miss.) 131 
S. W. 351. 
In Walker v. Cosgrove, (Ky. 1925) 273 S. W. 450, 
tenant agreed to take good care· of said property, to 
cause or permit no waste, to make all ordinary repairs. 
The oourt said: 
''If the property was in bad shape and the 
drainage pipes were in a dila:pidated condition at the 
time appellee Cosgrove leased the premises from 
Perkins, we do not think he was obligated under his 
contract to restore the waste pipe. It was not the . 
duty of the tenant to add a drain pipe where none 
had been before or make new one that was decayed 
and useless at the time he went into possession, but 
only to make ordinary repairs such as resulted from 
and were made necessary by and from reasonable 
use of the premises.'' 
The Lessors in this case were under no obligation to 
take care of roof drainage, eyen ~' as alleged in the 
complaint, appellants requested respondents to put the 
roof in proper condition ''so as to J!rovide proper drain~ 
age", if it necessitated changing of the roof from its con-
dition at the date of the lease·. The covenant ''to keep 
the roof in good condition and repair" implies the ex~ 
istence of the roof as it had been accepted and the Lessor 
became obligated only if such roof afterwards beeame out 
of rH~pair. As before stated, the covenant cannot be exr 
tended or enlarged. 
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In D1cight v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., (Mass.) 128 Mass. 
280, 282, the landlord contracted to ''repair and renew'' 
• ·H"L-
so far as necessary the gutter of a )fill. I-Ield he was 
obligated to n1ake such repairs and renewals as were 
necessary in order that the existing gutter should do all 
that it was capable of doing vYhen in good condition ac-
cording to its orig1'nal const·nu1ction, and did not require 
the Lessor to build a new gutter of a different construc-
tion, even though the original plan was defective. 
In eomplaining of our interpretation of the lease, 
counsel declare: 
''The defendants filed lengthy briefs in which 
they persistently and repeatedly inaccurately set 
forth the Lessors' obligations with reference to the 
roof. They cited numerous eases. involving only the 
word 'repair' to the effect that keeping premis,es 
in 'repair' meant only keeping the premises in the 
state of repair they were in at the time they were en-
tered upon by the Lessee. That, however, is not the 
situation or the question present here. More than 
repairs is involved. The complaint alleges that the 
plaintiffs never ins!pected the roof, knew nothing 
about the condition of it, had no concern with the 
roof because of the defendants' assertions and rep-
resentations that plaintiffs had no responsibility 
for the roof and that they, defendants, would take 
care of it. The lease does not limit defendants' duty 
merely to keeping the roof in repair. They are also 
required for the entire term to keep it in good con· 
dition." (Br. 39'). 
Counsel realize that they are on narrow footing if 
they must rely on the lease itself, so they assert· that it 
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is alleged in the co-mplaint that ''plaintiffs never in-
spected the roof, knew nothing about the condition of it 
. . . " and that defendants asserted and represented 
that they "would take care of it." This same argument is 
repeated -on page 55 of appellants' brief with the added 
remark that in October, 1945 (eight months after the 
lease was signed) "James L. White assured the pJain-
tiff, Hubert Wolfe, tha.t he had put the roof in good con--
dition a.nd that it was in excellent shape." These state .. 
ments are substantially the same as the allegations of the 
complaint (See App. Br. pp. 24-25) and constitute a 
manifest effort to avoid the consequences of appellants' 
written stipulation that they ''accept the premises in the 
condition they are now in," that is, as. of February 19, 
1945. There is no allegation that there was any fraud 
when the agreement was signed or that the lease agree-
ment was, for any consideration, modified by any oral 
stipulations by the Lessors. The agreement measures the 
obligations of the parties notwithstanding conversations 
(if any there were) whether before or after the lease was 
signed. This proposition is elementary. 
In Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 530, it is 
said: 
''The appellant's contention is that the uncon-
tradicted evidence being to the effect that the broker 
Davis agreed to accept $300 as a full commission in 
the event he succeeded in closing the deal, therefore 
in any event the trial court should not have granted 
judgment for more than $300. This contention can-
not be sustained because whatever was said between 
Davis and Huffaker concerning the amount of the 
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commission, prior to and at the time of the signing 
of the written listing contract, was merged in the 
written contract. Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. 
Heath et al., 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, 64 A. L. R. 368. 
The writing defines the rights of the parties with 
respect to the amount of commission which is to be 
paid, and any evidence tending to vary or contra.-
dict the terms of the written instrument is incom-
petent, in the absence of fraud, mistake, or misrep-
resentation, none of which is claimed in this case, 
and hence must be disregarded by the court.'' 
And in Hrillora.n Judge Trust Comparwy v. Heath, 70 
Utah 124, 135, it is said: 
''Nothing is better settled in the law, where there 
is a contract in writing, than that all preliminary 
negotiations are merged in the written contract.'' 
Likewise any statement of White after the lease was 
signed that he had fixed the roof would be immaterial. 
No liability could attach by reason of such a remark. 
ACTS OF BUILDING INSPECTOR IMPOSED NO 
OBLIGATION ON LESSORS 
The Building Inspector might point out the things 
he wanted changed (which he did not do) but he could 
in no way change the contract between the parties as 
to who would be obligated to pay for such changes. 
Assunung then that the Lessors' only obligation was 
to ''keep the roof in good condition and repair'' having 
reference to the condition of the roof at the date of the 
lease and to the Lessees' acceptance of the building in its 
then condition, not to construct a new roof, where in the 
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complaint is it alleged that the roof had become out of 
repair after March 7, 1945 ~ We search the complaint in 
vain for any such allegation. The lease required the 
Lessee to make "permanent improvements . . . in-
cluding the installation of a first class front . . . which 
improvements shall cost not less, but may cost more than 
$10,000," and it is. alleged that preliminary to making 
said permanent improve·ments, the Lessees applied for a 
permit and that the Building Inspector said (See letter 
March 21, 1946·) : 
"It has come to my attention that the rafters 
which form the roof framing have been overstress•ed 
and a.re sagging under the load they carry. Also 
the girders between the columns at the rear are un-
dersized and bowed." (Italics ours.) ( App. Br., p. 
29.) 
It is also alleged that he states: 
''This condition must be remedied and there-
fore your application is being held in abeyance until 
assurance is given that the roof condition will be 
taken car1e of." (App. Br., p. 30.) 
It is also alleged that after Hargreaves, the chief 
Building Inspector, had made an inspection his criticism 
was (letter of April 29, 1946; App. Br. pp. 30-31.) "that 
the roof truss system fo·r the main forepart of the store" 
and" the trusS<es were not adequate both as to design and 
as to erection,'' but these criticisms which are· relied upon 
by the plaintiffs do not constitute ground for complaint 
against the Lessors. They relate to ''design and con-
struction'' of the ''trusses'' and of the overstres•sing of 
the "rafters which form the roof framing and to the 
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'' ~tndersized'' girders which are ''bowed.'' It is nowhere 
alleged that any of these conditions occurred after the 
lease was made, and, of course, if they existed when the 
lease was entered into they were conditions which the 
Lessee expressly accepted. None of the so-called defects 
complained of by the Building Inspector imposed any 
duty on the Lessors when the Lessees accepted the build-
ing as it was, and when the Lessees expressly agreed that 
all ''improvements, upkeep and repairs of every kind and 
nature whatsoever, regardless of the extent thereof and 
whether the same be ordinary or extr:aordinary amd re-
gardless of how the same may be necessitated" (except 
ordinary repairs to the roof) were to be made by the 
Lessees. The improvements which were to cost $10,-
000.00 or more and which the Lessees were obligated to 
make were undoubtedly structural improvements and so 
regarded by the Lessees, for the lease itself provides 
(Paragraph 3) : 
''After said permanent improvements are made 
it is agreed that further structwral c-hanges shall not 
be made to said premises by the Lessees without 
first obtaining the written consent of the Lessors.'' 
" 'Structural change' is such a ehange as to 
affect a substantial and vital part of the premises 
as would change its characteristic appearance, the 
fundamental purpose o.f its erection or the uses con-
templated or a change of such nature as would af-
fect the very realty itself -extraordinary in scope 
and effect or unusUJal in expenditure. Paye v. City 
of Grosse Point, 271 N. W. 826, 279 Mich. 254." 
See also Plaza A1nusement Co. v. Rothenberg, 
(Miss.) 131 So. 350. 
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make pHrm:anent improvements which if they desired, 
could include construction of a new roof of steel beam 
construction but which had nothing at all to do with the 
repair of the then Hxisting roof. 
In Pratt v. Grafton Ele:atric Company, (Mass.) 65 
N. E. 63, the lease provided that the LessHe should make 
all necessary repairs, but the public authorities required 
a repair to the gates of the mill pond, the subject mat~ 
ter of the lease. Held that it was not the Lessors' obli-
gation to conform to the requirements of public authority. 
In Knight v. Fo.s,ter, (N. C.) 79 S. E. 614, the. city 
ordinance required that a gate on the leased premises 
should he changed to swing inward instead of outward. 
Held it was not a repair and the Lessor was. not obligated. 
In Victor A. Harter Re.alty Company v. Lee, 132 N. 
Y. 8. 447, it was held that the mere- fact that the order 
of the Tenement House' Department was for such an al-
teration as would increase the value of the prope-rty 
imposed no burden upon the landlord to make the alter-
ation. 
In Clark v. Yukon Inv. Co., (Wash.) 145 Pac. 624, 
it is he~ld: 
"Laws of 1909, p. 43, regulating buildings used 
for hotels, section 11 (Rem. & Bal. Code-, Sec. 6040) 
of which imposes a penalty upon every owner, 
manager, agent, or pers·on in charge of a hotel for 
failure to comjply with the act, does not require the 
owner of a building, le-ased for a long term to a 
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tenant who is conducting a hotel on the premises, 
under a lea.se which did not require the owner to 
make repairs or equip the building for such purpose, 
to pay for the installation of a fire eseape, as re-
quired by the city under the authority of that act; 
the term ''owner of the hotel'' referring to the 
ow-ner of the hotel business and not to the owner of 
the building in which it was conducted.'' 
Counsel cite the case of Herald Square ReaUy Com-
pany v. Saks, (N. Y.) 109 N. E. 545, (Br. p. 48) to sup'" 
port their contention that it was Lessors' obligation to 
comply with requirements of public authorities. Assum-
ing that any such requirements were legally made (which 
we deny), said case is clearly inapplicable. There, pl'ans 
for the building were submitted to the tenant and ap-
proved by him. These plans included a projection over 
a portion of the sidewalk, of the show windows on the 
ground floor. The plans were then submitted to the 
munici)pal authorities and by them approved. The lease 
was executed November 2, 1903, and it provided, among 
other things that the Lessee should comply at its own ex-
pense with all requirements of public authorities. Eight 
years later the municipality repealed all regulations 
which permitted the Building Commissioner to allow 
burilding encroachments on the sidewalk, and ordered all 
such encroachments removed. The Lessor incurred the 
ex;pense of the removal of the show-window obstruction 
and sought to recover from the tenant under the covenant 
of the Lessee hereinbefore mentioned. The court he,ld the 
Lessee was not liable, using this languag~e : 
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''This change in municipal policy bas taken 
place since execution of the lease between these 
parties and the construction of the lease may be de-
termined by extrinsic conditions that existed at the 
time of its execution. 
"It is not to he assumed therefore that the 
comprehensive phrases of the lease of all of which 
were quite germane and appropriate to existing 
conditions, were intended to rupply to future events 
not then in contemplation. 
''The language of this lease, construed in the 
light of contemporaneous regillations, UJsages and 
customs, seems to require the conclusion that it was 
not the purpose of the parties to subject the tenant 
to an expense caused wholly by extraordinary and 
unforeseen building alterations made necessary by 
a subsequent and radical change in the policy of the 
municipal government." (Italics ours.) 
There is no similarity between the facts in that case 
and those in the case at bar. 
As we have shown, Lessors bad no obligation to heed 
letters of the Building Inspector. Lessors' liability must 
depend upon the lease itself, and the existence of a Build-
ing Code and the fact that an application was n1ade to 
the Building Inspector can neither add to nor detract 
from the Lessors' obligation under the lease. Therefore, 
aU the allegations as to what the Building Oode requires 
and as to what is contained in the letters of the Building 
Inspector as to "design" or "erection" and as to what 
Lessees claim they did to comply with his suggestions 
or requirements are wholly irrelevant. 
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But eyen if under some condi ti·ons Lessors might 
haye been obligated to pay heed to the Building Inspec-
tor, the alleg-ations of the eomplaint show affirmatively 
that no such obligation was imposed on the Lessors in 
this case. Said Code (made a part of plaintiffs' com-
plaint) among other things provides: 
(a) No person shall repair any building without a 
permit from the Building· Inspector upon apjpJication 
therefor. 
(b) The Building Inspector shall be furnished 
with plans and specifications of the work to be done, ex-
cept that in case of minor repairs the Inspector may 
issue a permit without such plans and specifications. 
(parenthetically may we remind the court that the 
Building Inspector stated in his letter to Lessees of 
:March :21, 1946, ''a plan showing your projposal will he 
expected. '') 
(c) The work must be done according to the Build-
ing Code (Building Code Section 201). 
(d) The Building Inspector is authorized to en-
force the Building Code. 
(e) Whenever any building is used or occupied 
contrary to the provisions of the Building Code, the 
Building Inspector shall order such use or occw(pancy dis-
continued by notice served on any person using the same, 
and the building shall be vacated withitn ten da;ys after 
the service of such notice. Provided that in case of an 
e1nergency: 
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(f) Any building if found to be dangerous to per-
son or property or wnsafe for the purposes for which it 
is being used ma.y be condemned. The Building Insrr;).ec-
tor may order portions of the structure exposed for in-
spection and if the building is found to be unsafe, the 
Building Inspector shall serve notice in writing on the 
-owner, reputed owner or person in charge setting fo,rth 
what must be done to make such building safe. The per-
son receiving such notice must proceed within forty-
eight hours thereafter to make the changes, repairs or 
alterations set out in such notice. 
(g) Service of notice in writing means "personal 
service'' on the Lessor if within the city lirnits. (Section 
301 Building Code.) 
The allegations In plaintiffs' complaint show af-
firmatively that there was no compliance with the Build-
ing Code which could possibly impose any responsi-
bility on Lessors: 
(a) Because the notice alleged to have been given 
Lessors was not personally served upon or even ad-
dressed to them. 
(b) The notice alleged to have been given relates 
to structural conditions and not to the roof. 
(c) Said notice does not u set forth what must be 
done" by way of repairs to the roof. 
Therefore, taking all the allegations of the com-
plaint, there is no basis for any liability on the Lessors, 
even if the lease contemplated that Lessors should cmn· 
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ply with the Building Code, (\Yhich we deny) for the 
proper proceedings were not observed to impose such 
or any responsibility. 
LESSEES' SEEK: TO RECOVER FOR 
STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS 
Counsel concede, and paragraph 3 of the lease pro~ 
\ides, that Lessees were obligated to make certain un-
specified permanent improvements (including a first~ 
class front) to cost not less than $10,000.00 and that no 
further ''structural improveme'ltts'' were to be made 
without Lessors' consent. It was immaterial to Lessors 
how much Lessees might determine to expend in excess 
of the .$10,000.00 and, therefore, if they saw fit to sub-
stitute a new steel roof structure for the old one con-
structed of wood in making said ''permanent improve-
ments,'' how can they expect to recover from Lessors 
the cost of such roof structure~ They needed no other 
consent or approval of the Lessors to build such new 
roof structure than is contained in paragraph 3. But, 
they argue, such "permanent improvements" did not 
contemplate new roof construction for under the lease 
the building was to have a safe roof structure and one 
in good condition when Lessees went into possession, and 
the building of a new roof was a structural improve-
ment outside of and beyond the ''permanent improve-
ments'' required of the lessee. As suggested above the 
old roof structure had be-en accepted as of February 
19th. Its structural condition then was, and must have 
been, the same as found by the Building Inspector, for 
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his criticism was as to ''the design and as to the erec-
tion'' of the trusses. V\7 e have also shown by the au-
thorities that our obligation ''to keep the roof in good 
condition and re,pair" did not obligate us to "put" or 
"place" the roof in any other condition structually than 
it was when the Lessees accepted it, or to make the 
premises tenantable. It should be noted that differing 
from the Lessors' restricted covenant to repair, the 
Lessees' covenant is in the broadest language. Indeed 
it is difficult to see how language could have been 1nore 
effective to impose upon the Lessees the obligation to 
do extraordinary alterations and repairs. It is evident 
from a reading of the entire lease that the premises were 
rented to Lessees ''as is'' at· a reduced rental, with the 
clear understanding that they needed to be structually 
remodeled to fit the needs of Lessees and this remodel-
ing was to be at the expense of the Lessees. It would 
he patently contrary to the intent of the parties, as 
shown by the entire lease, to enlarge the Lessors' cove-
nant beyond its legal meaning, which is that the Lessors 
were to make only ordinary repairs to the roof, such as 
is done by a roofer, as distinguished from a structural 
steel worker. It is made plain by the bill of particulars 
that the new steel roof structure enabled the Lessees 
to create a store building with an eighty-foot span with-
out a post in it. This might well be, a very advanta-
geous thing to do for a Lessee with a ten-year lease with 
an option of ten additional years, at a low rental. In 
fact, paragraph 3 of the lease fixes the low rental of 
$600.op per month "upon the express condition" that 
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the expensive permanent improvements will be made; 
and snid paragraph 3 further provides that ''Rental 
shall be paid during the time said improvements are 
being made," which further indicates that Lessees took 
the building as it stood. Lessees should not be per-
mitted to compel the Lessors to pay for such structural 
alterations, when there was clearly no intention of the 
parties, as shown by the lease, that the lessors were 
supposed to bear any such expense. 
To accept counsel's contention that the construe~ 
tion of the new steel roof structure was outside of the 
"permanent improvements" Lessees were obligated to 
make, puts the Lessees into an altogether untenable posi· 
tion, for they concede that ''further structural improve-
ments'' (other than the permanent improvements to 
cost $10,000.00 or more) could not be n1ade without 
Lessors' consent; that they did not have such consent, 
yet they are seeking reimbursmnent for doing what con-
fessedly they had no right to do. They do not allege 
that the Building Inspector required them to remove 
the wooden roof structure or to substitute one of steel, 
or that he required any particular or specified work to 
be done. It was the Lessees who decided what sort of 
improvement, alteration or change of the roof structure 
they would seek to hav,e the Lessors pay for, and they 
proceeded to do this structural work, which they say 
was in addition to the "permanent improvements," 
without getting Lessors' consent; and therefore, with-
out any right to do it, and they now seek to have Lessors 
pay for the new roof structure under Lessors' obliga-
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tion to" keep the old roof in good condition and repair." 
This argument of Lessees defeats itself. They offer 
anothe,r equally illogical reason why Lessors should 
pay for the new steel roof structure. They cite authority 
that if the Lessor fails to keep his covenant to repair, 
Lessee may make such repairs and recover the cost from 
the landlord or charge it against the rent, and yet they 
admit that the wor!k the Le·ssees performed and for 
which they are seeking to recover was not roof" repairs" 
under any definition of that word, but was structural 
improvement of the building, which they either have 
agreed to make or had no legal right to make without 
Lessors' consent, which consent they did not have, and 
they admit that they continued to pay the rent. 
THE CLAIMED BREACH OF COVENANT OF 
QUIET ENJOYMENT 
The lette:r:s of the Building Inspector do not, as ap-
pellants allege, refuse ''to allow the leased premises to 
he occupied at all until the roof is made safe;'' (Br., 
p. 19) nor do they impose any obligation whatever on 
the Lessors or the Lessees. The Building Inspector 
went no further than to say that it was "mandatory 
upon'' him 
''to refus·e to allow continued occupancy of this 
structure beyond the summ.er season for fear of 
heavy snow loading, which might cause total beam 
and truss failure and consequent collapse of the 
ro,of structure," 
and this remark was not within his authority under the 
Building Code. That Code (Section 301, which is made 
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a part of the complaint, Br., p. ~0) provides that "in 
the event of an emergency" when a building is "danger-
ous to person or property or ~~tnsafc for the purpose for 
lrhich it is being used," it may be condemned, but before 
condemnation, the Building Inspector shall serve notice 
of "what is to be done" and that 
''The person receiving such notice must com-
mence within forty-eight ho~trs to make the changes, 
repairs, or alterations set out in said notice and 
shall proceed diligently with such work or demol-
ish the building." 
When there is no emergency and the building is being 
used contrary to the Building Code, The Building In-
spector may order his requirements complied with with-
itn ten days or that the building be vacated. The letter 
of the Building Inspector attached to the complaint does 
not come within any of said provisions of the Code, 
and he could not refuse to permit the . building to be 
occupied "beyond this summer season" (whatever these 
words mean) because he had no such authority to make 
such an order. He is required to conform to the Code 
in making his directives and his letters show that he 
did not do so. It is idle for counsel to argue that the 
Building Inspector's mere statement as to what was 
wrong with the building without setting forth "what 
must be done" was sufficient to impose the obligation 
on anyone to destroy the wooden structure and con-
struct one of steel. 
It is upon the provisions of the Building Code and 
upon the letters of the Building Inspector that Lessees 
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rely for their claim that Lessors breached their cove-
nant to quiet enjoyment, that is to say, for Lessees 
claim that they were excluded from the possession of 
the premises for there is no other basis for their ''ex-
clusion'' alleged in the complaint. "\Vho was in pos-
session immediately after June 7, 1946~ Who was in 
possession when Lessees applied for the permit and 
when they tore off the old roof structure and con-
structed the steel roof structure~ By some kind of 
left-handed logic, Lessees seem to claim that even dur-
ing the time they were constructing the steel roof struc-
ture they were not in possession of the premises, even 
though they confirmed their possession by the pay-
ment of rent, which they are now seeking to recover 
back. So under the facts as appear from the complaint 
itself, there was no exclusion from the premises, nor 
any eviction. Plaintiffs rely upon Haywood v. Ogden 
Motor Company, 71 Utah 417, to support their conten-
tion that Lessors breached their covenant of quiet en-
joyin.ent, (Br., pp. 49-50) but in that case the Lessors 
remained in actual possession of the premises making 
certain repairs during part of the first month when 
Lessees were entitled to possession and the court held 
that in thus depriving Lessees of possession during such 
period they committed a trespass, and that Lessees had 
the right to counterclaim against an action for rent, for 
the period possession was denied them. No claim of 
trespass can be made against Lessors in this case, be-
cause Lessors were never in possession at any time sub-
sequent to February 19, 1945, or even before ·while the 
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Stewart Novelty Company's lease was in effect. Lessees 
must, as a matter of law, base their claim of Lessors' 
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment on eviction, 
either actual or constructi .. ue, for as stated by our court 
in the Heywood case: 
''It is also a general rule of law that a breach 
of covenant for quiet enjoyment cannot occur with-
out an eviction actual or constructive.'' 
Now, of course, Lessees cannot claim there was any 
actual eviction and the authorities hold without dissent 
that there can be no constructive eviction unless the 
tenant abandons the premises and that such abandon-
ment is necessary before the Lessee can defend against 
a claim for the rental. 32 A'm. Jrur., pp. 231, 236, 391-2, 
and cases cited. See also Stone v. Sullivan, (Mass.), 15 
N. E. (2) 476; 116 A. L. R. 1223. 
Our own court in Warm Spr·ings Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 50 Utah 58, 165 Pac. 788, recognizes this doctrine. 
Lessees went into possession according to the lease 
and they have been in possession ever since, and there 
was, and could be, no breach of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment, for the Building Inspector did not attempt 
by anything set forth in his letters or otherwise to in-
terfere with Lessees' possession on June 7, 1946, or at 
any other time, nor did he order them to vacate, and 
certainly no one else interfered with them. The con-
tention of counsel with respect to this Inatter is wholly 
without merit. 
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LESSOR EXE11PT FROM LIABILITY 
Even if by any possible construction of the allega-
tions of the complaint, the covenant of the Lessors to 
"keep the roof in good condition and repair" was 
breached (and we say no such construction can be placed 
upon them), nevertheless the Lessors are not liable. 
Paragraph eleven of the lease provides: 
''Lessors shall not be liable for any damage 
occasioned by failure to keep said premises in re-
pair and shall not be liable for any damage done, 
caused or occasioned by or from plumbing, gas, 
water, steam or other pipes, or the bursting, leak-
ing or running of any washstand, tank, water closet 
or waste pipe, in, upon or about said building or 
premises, nor from any damage occasioned by wa-
ter arising from acts or neglect of neighboring ten-
ants." 
This provision can only mean that the parties agreed 
that the Lessors were absolved from liability for failure 
to fulfill the only obligation imposed upon them, to-wit, 
to "keep the roof in good condition and repair. " It 
can not possibly relate to Lessees' failure to make re-
pairs, because, without such provision, the Lessor could 
not be liable for the Lessees' breach. The provision 
must be given its plain and obvious meaning. It is tan-
tamount to a covenant not to sue, and there is no legal 
reason preventing the parties from entering into the 
stipulation above quoted. 
In Buchanan v. Tessler, (Ga.) 148 S. E. 614, the 
lease provided : 
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"The Lessee hereby releases Lessor from any 
and all damag·e to both person and property and 
will hold the Lessor harmless from all such damages 
during the term of this lease. ' ' 
A subsequent paragraph provided: 
"It is agreed the Lessor shall be called on to 
mak,e no repairs of any nature whatsoever during 
the term of this lease, except repairs to the roof." 
It was held that Lessor was not liable for damages by 
reason of the roof becoming out of repair. 
In Gralnick v. illagid, (Mo.) 238 S. W. 132, the lease 
provided: 
''Lessor agrees to do repairing.'' 
It also contained the provision: 
''Said Lessor shall not be liable to said Lessee 
or agents, guests or employees for any damage 
caused to his or their person or property by water, 
rain, snow, ice, sleet, fire, storms and accidents, or 
by breakage, stoppage or leakage of water, gas, 
heating and sewer pipes upon, about or adjacent to 
said premises.'' 
The court uses this language : 
''While it is true in paragraph three, 'the Lessor 
agrees to do repairing' that paragraph nowhere 
states what kind of repairing she is to do, but most 
certainly that paragraph does not mean that the 
Lessor was to make such repairs as would protect 
the Lessee and his property from damages on ac-
count of rain and water, ice, etc. for the obvious 
reason that both parties had agreed in paragraph 
one that the Lessor should not be liable for any 
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damages done to the property of the Lessee on ac-
count of water, rain, ice, etc. . . . 
''But be that as it nmy, and concede for the 
sake of argument without deciding it, that the 
words 'the Lessor agrees to do repairing' as found 
in paragraph three, meant that she was to replace 
the roof or other parts of the building when de-
stroyed by fire, yet we are unable to see in what 
possible manner that would benefit the Lessee in this 
case or render the Lessor liable when both parties 
clearly agree by the language found in paragraph 
one that the Lessor should not be liable to the Lessee 
because of any damages done to him or his prop-
erty on account of rain, water, etc.'' 
In Inglis v. Garland, (Cal.) 64 Pac. (2d) 501, the 
lease provided: 
"Tenant agrees that tenant will not, and that 
agents, servants and others claiming the right un-
der tenants to be in the premises or in said building 
. . . shall not make any claim against landlord for 
any injury, loss or damage to person or property 
occurring therein from any cause.'' 
The tenant claimed damage as a result of a defective 
roof drain-pipe. The landlord had undertaken to re-
pair the roof, but in such repairs the defective drain pipe 
had been overlooked. Held that the landlord was not 
liable in view of the above quoted provision. 
In Higgins v. Menckton, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 
1938), 83 Pac. (2d) 516 at 521, several leases were in-
volv,ed, all having clauses to about the same effect, that 
''the Lessee shall not claim or have any dmnages, or right 
to claim damages by reason of any reclan1ation work or 
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leYee work which may in any way affect the demised 
premises or by reason of the failure to perfm·m any of 
said work.'' The court said: 
. '• These clauses quoted from the 3 leases have a 
double application and significance. They are in 
plain and unequivocal language complete releases 
of all claims for damages against the lessor arising 
out of poor construction or poor maintenance of the 
levees, and they are at the same time full waivers of 
any claim or right of action based upon the cove-
nants of the contracts of 1902 and 1905. '' 
The court sustained a general demurrer in a suit 
brought for both breach of contract and in tort arising 
from the fact that the levees broke and inundated the 
lands of the Lessees. 
In Franklin Fire lfYls. Co. v. Moll, (Ind.) 58 N. E. 
(2d) 947, the plaintiff sought damages suffered by. its 
assured due to leaks in the plumbing. The lease pro-
vided: 
''Lessor not liable for any damage or InJury 
sustained by Lessee due to building becoming out of 
repair or from water or steam or from plumbing or 
pipes or from any tank, wash stand or water closet 
or from water or ice from the roof.'' 
The contention was made that this provision did not 
exempt the Lessor from liability for his negligenoe in 
maintaining the plumbing in good condition which he 
was obligated to do. The court sustained a general de-
murrer to the complaint on the ground that ev·en if the 
landlord was negligent, the foregoing provision absolved 
him from liability. See also Kirshenbaum, (N. Y.) 180 
N. E. 245. 
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In Peca.rre v. Grover, 5 La. Ct. of App. 676, the stat-
ute made Lessor responsible for vices or defects in 
leased premises. The lease provided: 
''No repairs shall he done by Lessor except such 
as may he needed to the roof. 
''The Lessor will not he responsible for dam-
ages caused by leaks in the roof or by any vice or 
defect on the leased premises except in the case of 
positive neglect on his part to have the repairs made 
after notice.'' 
The syllabus reads.: 
"It is lawful to stipulate in a lease that the 
Lessor shall not be responsible for damages caused 
by any vice or defect on the leased premises. With 
such a stipulation in a leas.e the Lessee cannot re-· 
cover damages against the Lessor for injury re~ 
ceived from falling plaster. Such a stipulation is 
not against public policy.'' 
In the body of the opinion, the court says : 
''Very often parties insert in the lease clauses 
having for their object to restrict the obligation of 
warranty of the Lessor; these claims be it under-
stood should receive their execution and the Lessor 
shall not be held for any warranty for the vice or 
the vices of which he is formally exonerated.'' 
In another part of the opinion the court said: 
"But the Lessor may by a clause of the· lease 
put aside or restrict his warranty just as the Lessee 
may expressly or impliedly renounce the warranty. 
Public order is not interested in the question.'' 
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See also BuUock v. Colema.n, (Ala.) 33 So. 884. 
The only case on the question of exemption of the 
landlord from liability which counsel cite is Columbia 
Labora.tories r. Califor·uia Beauty Supply Co., 148 Pac. 
(2d) 15, which is not in point at all. In that case, the 
court simply held that if property not covered by the 
lease became out of repair so that the tenant (of other 
premises) suffered injury, the landlord would he liable. 
Why the case is cited, counsel alone can give a reason. 
COM~1E~TS ON IM~IATERIAL ALLEGATIONS 
The complaint contains allegations which are, in sub-
stance, repeated in appellants' brief and which can have 
no possible bearing on the legal obligations of the par-
ties. We shall refer to only a few of them. References 
are to the pages of Appellants' Brief. 
Page 45: 
''We accepted the premises in the condition they 
were in only upon defendants' express agreement 
that the roof would be made and kept safe for the 
entire term of the lease, and particularly at the time 
we were to have the right of occupancy." 
Any such ''express agreernent'' was clearly super-
seded by the written agreement Fhereby Lessees ac-
cepted the building as it was. Halloran-Judge Tr. Co. v. 
Heath, 70 Utah 124. 
Page 46: 
"Thus on June 7, 1946, when defendants had 
agreed we might enter into possession of the prop-
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erty, we were r~efused a building permit and thus 
prevented from making the permanent improve-
ments which we had agreed to make because of 
plaintiffs' dereliction, and we were also advised defi-
nitely that continued occupancy of the structure 
would not be allowed. We could not get a building 
permit and we could not occupy the premises be-
cause the roof was unsafe." (Italics ours.) 
Respondents did not agree to obtain for appellants, 
or guarantee that appellants could obtain, a building 
permit to make the permanent improvements. Accord-
ing to their complaint, they actually made permanent 
improvements, so they were not ''prevented from mak-
ing" them. Did they make them without a permit~ If 
they ''could not occupy the premises because the roof 
was unsafe,'' who was occupying the premises when 
the permanent improvements were being made~ Ap-
pellants' conduct disputes their own statem.ents. 
Furthermore, as the foregoing staten1ent and the 
argument at page 50 of the brief have no relation to 
any other claim of appellants except that there was a 
breach by respondents of the covenant of quiet ~enjoy­
ment, please bear in mind that such covenant is not 
breached except there be an eviction (Haywood v. Ogden 
Motor Co., 71 Utah 417) and even to rely on construc-
tive eviction, the tenant must abandon the premises. 
(Stone v. Sullivan, (Mass.) 15 N. E. (2d) 476.) 
Page 47: 
''The defendants never at any time attempted 
by any proper proceedings to remove the objections 
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of the Building Inspector or to comply with his 
requirements.'' 
The Building Inspector never at any time made any 
requirements. At no time did he ''set forth what must 
be done" as required by the Building Code, and if he had, 
in view of the specific covenant of the Lessees to make 
all improvements and repairs (except ordinary repairs 
to the roof) ''regardless of how the same may be neces-
sitated," it would have been Lessees' duty to follow the 
directiYe of the Building Inspector. The Building In-
spector's criticism related wholly to structural defects, 
and Lessees cannot hold Lessors for the cost of perma-
nent improvements of upwards of $10,000.00 they were 
obligated to make, and did make, whether with a permit 
or without, by asserting that Lessors failed to make it 
possible for them to secure such permit. 
Page 48: 
"Unless the lease itself requires the tenant to do 
so, the tenant is under no duty to make changes, 
structural or otherwise, or alterations or improve-
ments ordered by the public authorities.'' 
If the letters of the Building Inspector can be con,... 
strued as an order to do anything, then what he required 
to be done was something "necessitated" within the spe-
cific obligation of appellants under the lease. 
Page 53: 
'' BH·ause the city authorities said the roof was 
unsafe, that fact alone required son1eone to make 
the roof safe. At the time the building inspector 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
declared the roof to be unsafe, we had neither the 
actual possession, nor the right to possession of the 
premises. We couldn't have gone in and fixed the 
roof had we desired. It was still in this condition 
when our right to possession under the lease ac-
crued." (Italics ours.) 
This statement is more of counsel's mental gym-
nastics. Is it true that merely because the Building In-
spector declared the roof to be unsafe, someone ( irre-
spective of the provisions of the lease) bad to make it 
safe~ That declaration taken alone impos·ed no duty 
on anyone. The building might have been left just as it 
was even if appellants could not have used it. Resort 
must be had to the leas·e to ascertain who ''had to make 
it safe.'' Certainly Lessors did not covenant to do so . 
.. A.ppellants say "they couldn't have gone in and fixed it." 
Well, as soon as their "right of possession accrued," 
they did actually ''go in'' while the roof ''was still in 
this condition" and construct a ne.w roof of steel beam 
construction and a new understructure. If they did not 
possess the right to do this work under the lease, from 
what source did they derive their authority~ 
Page 55: 
"We also alleged that the roof was unsafe and 
not in good condition and repair in January and 
became progressively worse, and that at the time 
we were to take possession in June, it bad become 
so unsafe a.s to be dangerous; that we do not know 
when the roof first became dangerous but that it 
did become dangerous and became progressively 
worse from the date of the lease until J nne 7, 1946. '' 
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Yet at pag-e 53, counsel deelnrcs: ''At the tim.e the 
building inspector declared the roof to be unsafe," ap-
pellants had no ''right to possession of the premises,'' 
(that was in ~Iarrh, 1946) and adds: "It ·w·as still in this 
condition" (that is, the same condition) "when our right 
to possession under the lease accrued.'' 
Furthermore, the allegation that after the lease was 
entered into the roof conunenced to sag, which sagging 
gradttw;lly becmne zrorse, adds nothing to impose liability 
on Lessors. If Lessors were liable at all to construct a 
new roof, it is immaterial when the roof began to sag. 
It is apparent from the complaint that if such sagging 
occurred it was due to original faulty construction. If 
the sagging required extraordinary repairs such as the 
construction of an entirely new roof (a steel roof) the 
lease imposed the duty upon the Lessees, not the Lessors. 
By way of conclusion, let us very briefly summarize. 
1. There is no implied covenant on the part of a 
Lessor that leased premises are fit for occupancy or 
tenantable or inhabitable or safe for use. If the Lessee 
would have any such guarantee., he must have it ex-
pressly set forth in the lease. 
32 Am. Jur. 526; 
Robinson v. Wilson, (Wash.) 183 Pac. 331; 
Tiffany on Landlord•and Tenant, p. 86. 
2. The lease in the case at bar contains no such 
covenant or guarantee, the Lessors being bound by the 
one covenant only, to ''keep the roof in good condition 
and repair." 
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3. The covenant of the Lessors to ''keep the roof 
in good condition and re,pair" cannot be enlarged by 
construction and means the same as the covenant to 
keep the roof in as good condition as when the lease 
was made, that is, in its condition on February 19, 1945, 
and said covenant is not a covenant that the building was 
safe or fit for occ1.1tpancy or tenantable. Farr v. Wasatch 
Chemical Company, (Utah) 143 Pac. (2d) 281, clearly 
holds that a covenant ''to keep the floor and roof in 
good order and repair so as to keep said premises ten~ 
an table'' did not obligate the Lessor to place the build-
ing in a tenantable condition. 
4. Lessors' covenant was to keep the old roof in 
the condition in which it had been accepted, not to con-
struct a roof structure of steel. Lessor's only obliga-
tion was to make ''ordinary repairs'' to the existing roof. 
5. There was no order of public authorities for the 
construction of a steel roof structure or any order to do 
any specific work. Nothing was done by the Building 
Inspector which obligated either the Lessors or the 
Lessees to do anything. The provisions of the Ordinance 
were not followed so as to impose any obligation on 
anyone. If any valid order had been made, it would 
have been the Le,ss·ees' obligation to comply if they de-
sired to continue to occupy the building as their cove-
nant to make ''permanent improvements'' to cost $10,-
000.00 or more and to make ''all improvements, upkeep 
and repa.irs of every kind a1nd natu1"e and whether the 
same be ordinary or extraordinary and regardless of how 
the same may be necessitated" is so all-inclusive that no 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
other construction can fairly be gi \'en to the language 
other than that Lessees were bound to do whatever under 
existing ordinances the public authorities might require. 
6. If the construction of the new steel roof struc-
ture is to be regarded as not included within the "per-
manent impro1·ements," then Less,ees had no right to 
construct it without Lessors' consent, and such consent 
not ha,ing been obtained, Lessees cannot recover from 
Lessors the cost ther,eof. 
7. There was no breach of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment because there was no eviction, actual or con-
structive, and no abandonment of the premises by the 
Lessees, and they ar~e therefore, not entitled to recover 
rent paid to Lessors or to recover rental paid on the 
premises they continu~to occupy during the time they 
were making the ''permanent improvements'' on the 
leased premises or wrongfully making ''further struc-
tural changes" without the Lessors' consent. 
8. The Lessors being absolved from liability under 
paragraph 11 of the lease, no action can be maintained 
against the,m even if they violated the covenant con-
tained in the lease (which we deny). 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JESSE R. S. BUDGE, 
H. L. MULLINER, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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